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ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY*
Sir Gordon Slynn t
I
THE ECONOMIC LAW OF THE COMMON
MARKET
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
In 1955 at Messina, Italy, the foreign ministers of six West Euro-
pean countries' resolved "to pursue the establishment of a united
Europe through the development of common institutions, a progres-
sive fusion of national economies, the creation of a common market
and the harmonisation of social policies."' 2 They did so against the
background of the political and economic effects of the second World
War, and of the efforts made, notably the assistance of the United
States of America through the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for
* This article was adapted from the Irvine Lectures, which were given at the Cornell
Law School on September 6-7, 1984.
t Advocate General, Court of Justice of the European Communities.
1. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. In 1973 the EEC was enlarged to include Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom. In 1981 Greece became a member, and in June 1985 a treaty admitting Spain
and Portugal was signed. The treaty must be ratified by all twelve countries by January 1,
1986.
2. LORET-rE, Lu MARCHPf COMMUN 60 (1961).
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European Economic Co-operation, to put Europe back into physical
and economic shape. They did so more specifically in the light of the
experience of three of their members (Belgium, The Netherlands, and
Luxembourg) in creating an economic union by means of an internal
market, in which barriers to the movement of goods, capital, and
workers were set aside, and the experience of all six of them in the
European Coal and Steel Community, which had been set up in 1952.3
That Community was born out of the idea that century-old conflicts
between France and Germany over the industrial areas that skirt their
frontiers might be avoided if a supra-national body could be founded
on a common market, common objectives, and common institutions.
Such a body would seek to rationalise the production and distribution
of coal and steel in order to encourage expansion, promote free compe-
tition, and take care of the interests of the worker and the consumer.
The European Coal and Steel Community, at least in its early days,
had shown that a supra-national agency could work amongst Euro-
pean states and could increase economic progress.
Carried forward by the vision and realism of great men such as
Schuman and Monnet, the original members set out in the Treaty of
Rome in 1957 to create a union among the nations of Europe. 4 The
union would not be limited to specific industries, but would be con-
cerned with regulating the economic activities of those nations in the
interests of economic and social progress and of preserving and
strengthening peace and liberty. At the same time, the members cre-
ated a third Community, the European Atomic Energy Community,
in order to further the development of a powerful nuclear industry
that would provide energy, modernise resources, and promote peace
and prosperity among the peoples of Europe.5
The preambles to the three Treaties that established these Com-
munities show that their aims were partly political, but the Treaties do
not in fact go very far toward political union. They do not create a
federation in the sense in which you understand it in the United States
of America, although there are many, including a majority of the
members of the Parliament of the Communities, who feel strongly that
a closer form of union should be realised.
The aims were predominantly economic. With ten Member
States, and a population that, when Spain and Portugal enter the
Communities, will exceed 300 million people, the Common Market is
3. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, done Apr. 18, 1951,
26 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited as E.C.S.C. Treaty].
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
5. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done Mar. 25,
1957, 28 U.N.T.S. 259.
[Vol. 18:1
ASPECTS OF EEC LAW
clearly an economic unit that cannot wholly be ignored by business-
men and their lawyers in other parts of the world.
With ten countries, each having different legal systems and histor-
ical traditions, there were bound to be difficulties, even in times of
prosperity, in merging into one Community. In times of serious reces-
sion those difficulties are more acute. Forming a united Community
might have been easy if the Member States could have begun by abol-
ishing all legal rules, all frontiers, and all restrictive practices, and if
they could have started with the assumption of one unified area, one
legal system, and one parliament. To persuade ten Member States to
give way on a wide variety of topics in the interests of the Communi-
ties' objectivies is not always easy, and at times the pace of the policy
makers has been slow, due largely to the protection of national inter-
ests. The role of the European Court of Justice has been critical, not
merely in ensuring that the policymakers, the executive Institutions,
and the Member States observe the rules of the Community, but also
in interpreting the law in such a way as to give effect to the fundamen-
tal and overriding objectives of the Community. This role is particu-
larly difficult and sensitive in a time of economic crisis.
This first lecture will describe some of the legal principles embod-
ied in the treaties and will discuss how the Court of Justice of the three
Communities has defined and developed those principles to achieve
the economic aims set out in the Treaties.
B. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EEC
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome gave the Economic Community
the task of "establishing a common market and progressively approxi-
mating the economic policies of the Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stabil-
ity, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the States belonging to it. ' ' 6
L Policy-Making and Legislative Bodies
In some areas, in what are called "the foundations of the Com-
munity," precise powers were vested in the Institutions of the Com-
munity and obligations imposed upon them. In these areas, the
Member States have substantially surrendered their own powers in the
interests of the Community as a whole. For example, the customs
union that was established 7 goes far beyond the previous agreements
for a free trade area among some of the Member States. Specific and
6. EEC Treaty, art. 2.
7. EEC Treaty, art. 9-11.
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precise provisions deal with the free movement of goods, of employed
and self-employed persons, and of businesses. The Common Market
was declared to extend to agriculture, 8 and Member States were
obliged to establish a common agricultural policy with the aims of
rationalising and increasing productivity, stabilising markets, assuring
supplies at reasonable prices, and providing a fair standard of living
for the agricultural community.
These "foundations" were accompanied by what in the Treaty is
called the "policy of the Community" 9-the provisions of the Treaty
that impose precise obligations. For example, the Treaty laid down
rules for the Community to administer in curbing restrictions on com-
petition and in restraining the aid that a Member State may provide to
its own industries.10 Moreover, the Council, which is the Commu-
nity's policy making and legislative body, has power to issue directives
to Member States obliging them to bring into line their national laws
and practices that directly affect the functioning of the Common Mar-
ket. Power over the Common Market's external commercial policy
was taken away from the Member States and vested in the Commu-
nity. On the other hand, in other areas, such as internal economic and
monetary policy, the Treaty's requirement of consultation and cooper-
ation is little more than exhortatory.
2. The Role of the European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) plays a vital role in promot-
ing Community objectives. Its overriding task is to ensure that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed. For
this purpose, since it has no inherent powers or jurisdiction other than
those conferred by the Treaties, it has been given certain tools. The
Court can rule whether a Member State has properly carried out its
obligations under the Treaty, for example by implementing Directives
to harmonise laws throughout the Community, or by permitting the
free movement of goods into or out of its territory." The Court can
also declare whether the Council and the Commission (the executive)
have violated the Treaty, or exceeded their powers, or failed to act
when the Treaty obliged them to act. 12 Finally, the Court can answer
questions put to it by national courts that face issues of Community
law in litigation before them.' 3
8. EEC Treaty, art. 38-47.
9. EEC Treaty, Part III.
10. EEC Treaty, art. 85-94.
11. EEC Treaty, art. 171.
12. EEC Treaty, art. 173, 175.
13. EEC Treaty, art. 177.
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C. JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES THAT PROMOTE THE ECONOMIC AIMS
OF THE TREATY
Economic law questions, whether involving intervention by legis-
lation or the maintenance of a properly functioning common market
with undistorted competition, have provided the Court with the
majority of its cases. Particularly numerous are cases referred by
national courts that involve the common agricultural policy and the
free movement of goods.
The Court has striven to avoid legislating through the vehicle of
judicial process. At the same time, it has striven to uphold the objec-
tives of the Treaty, which have to be applied in the light of changing
economic circumstances. This task sometimes makes it necessary to
avoid construing the words of the Treaty as they would have literally
been construed at the time the Treaty was signed.
In the operation of the common agricultural policy, politically
controversial as it is, considerable steps have been taken, even if pro-
gress is uneven. For example, Community market organisations have
been set up to control prices, quality, and systems of distribution of a
number of products such as cereals and milk and their derivatives. In
these areas, the Court has largely been concerned with the interpreta-
tion and effect of the measures taken, with their validity in the light of
the Treaty provisions, and with the division of responsibilities between
the Community and the Member States. These questions come from
the national courts in most cases, because the policy is administered
largely by agricultural intervention agencies on behalf of the Commu-
nity. For example, if a levy is claimed from or resisted by a trader in
proceedings in a national court, the validity of the levy and of the
legislation itself might raise a question of Community law that the
ECJ could or would ultimately decide. In cases involving agricultural
products for which Common Market organisations have not been set
up, the Court has not merely given a literal interpretation of the legis-
lation. The Court also has laid down general principles that are not
spelled out in the Treaty, but are derived from the traditions followed
in the Member States, such as proportionality and
nondiscrimination. 14
1. The Requirement of Proportionality
One general principle that the Court insists must be satisfied in
subordinate legislation of the Communities is proportionality. Obliga-
tions imposed on traders must not be disproportionately burdensome
14. These cases illustrate the Court's teleological approach to interpretation, which
certainly differs from the traditional, if not always contemporary, approach of the English
courts.
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in relation to the legitimate object to be achieved by the legislation. In
one case, the Commission found itself, as a result of the overproduc-
tion of milk, with large stocks of skimmed milk powder into which the
surplus milk had been converted. 15 This could be used for feeding
animals, particularly calves and pigs. A rival feed product of vegeta-
ble origin received an aid that effectively reduced the price. To get rid
of the skimmed milk powder, the Commission provided that the aid
for the vegetable product would only be paid if specified quantities of
skimmed milk powder were bought at a price three times the normal
price. The Court, whilst recognising that the surplus skimmed milk
powder existed only as a result of the common market in agriculture
and that it had to be disposed of, nonetheless found that the method
adopted was unreasonably onerous to the purchaser, and held the leg-
islation invalid.
Similarly, in another case, traders who were required to pay a
deposit in order to import tomato concentrates were refused the return
of their deposit because they had failed to present proof that the goods
had been imported within the time specified. 16 The Court had no diffi-
culty in holding that the failure to provide proof was ancillary to the
main obligation, which was to import the goods within a defined
period. Therefore, the Court held that the refusal to return the
deposit, whilst authorised by the words of the legislation, was dispro-
portionate. The position would have been different, however, if pro-
ducing the proof had been the primary rather than the ancillary
obligation.
2. The Requirements of Nondiscrimination
In the same vein, the Court has held that there exists in Commu-
nity law a general principle of nondiscrimination. Article 40(3) of the
Treaty, which excludes from Common Market organisations "any
discrimination between producers or consumers within the Commu-
nity," is merely a facet of this principle.
For example, between 1964 and 1974, under the common organi-
sation of the market in cereals, producers of starch and quellmehl
received a refund according to the quantities produced. The produc-
tion refund was then abolished for quellmehl but retained for starch
with the obvious intention, as a matter of policy, of furthering starch
production. In the preamble to the regulations that had first provided
for the refund, the two products were declared interchangeable. The
Court ruled that to take away the refund for one but not the other was
15. Case 114/76 Bela Miie Josef Bergman KG v. Grows-Farm GmbH & Co. KG,
1977 E.C.R. 1211, 25 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 83 (1979).
16. Case 122/78 Buitoni v. Fonds D'Orientation et de Regularisation des Marches
Agricoles, 1979 E.C.R. 677, 25 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 665 (1979).
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discriminatory and unlawful. 17 In a similar way the Court has pro-
tected producers and traders against intervention, in the interests of
the policy of the Commission, where the result was to take away rights
or to frustrate legitimate expectations of a continuing legal situation
on the basis of which producers had made their commitments. Sud-
den changes in the law that would have deprived them of anticipated
advantages have been held to be unlawful. The Court must uphold
policies that are adopted as part of the organisation of the market in
agricultural products, and it does not trespass on administrative dis-
cretion or appraisal. 18 However, the Court is astute in protecting the
trader from arbitrary or unjustifiable exercises of power.
The sensitivity of the Court to what it sees as the true interests of
the Community and of the individual is well illustrated by a case
involving the United Kingdom that at the time caused something of a
stir.19 Fish are included as agricultural products. The United King-
dom has a great economic interest in establishing and protecting
catchment areas for fish, as do other coastal states. The adoption of a
common fisheries policy had been determined to be a Community
responsibility, so the Community had exclusive power to legislate.
However, the Member States had found it impossible to agree, largely
because of nationalism and protectionism. The United Kingdom grew
tired of waiting and adopted its own measures in 1979. These were
held to be unlawful on two grounds. First, the Court held that the
United Kingdom could not go it alone in respect of something falling
within the ambit of Community affairs even if the Member States had
not agreed on a Community policy. A Member State must regard
itself as a trustee of Community interests and act only after consulta-
tion with and agreement by the Commission. The Court also held that
the measures adopted were bad in that the grant of licenses was so
discretionary that applicants could not know what their rights were
with sufficient certainty.
There are many who think that intervention and harmonisation
of laws need to be increased rather than slowed.
17. Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Firma Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. v. Hauptzollamt
Hamburg-St Annen, 1977 E.C.R. 1753, 25 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 445 (1979).
18. It is largely in the area of the agricultural policy that the Community court has
been concerned with fluctuations in exchange rates. Clearly, fluctuations in exchange rates,
in a market that aims at uniform prices, can cause disturbances in trade. The Court has
recognized that payments may have to be made by exporters or importers if national cur-
rencies fluctuate beyond a certain amount and that the Commission and Council must have
a large discretion as to when, how, and in what areas adjustments are made by monetary
compensatory amounts. The Court has, however, insisted that such amounts be no more
than what is necessary to cancel out the effects of such fluctuations in a system of floating
currencies.
19. Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, 33 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. 543 (1982).
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D. THE EEC AS AN INTERNAL MARKET
An important facet of the Common Market's existence is the goal
of undistorted competition within the Community. The Court has
expressed this goal aptly:
The concept of a common market as defined by the Court in a consistent line of
decisions involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra-Community trade in
order to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about condi-
tions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market. It is important
that not only commerce as such but also private persons who happen to be
conducting an economic transaction across national frontiers should be able to
enjoy the benefits of that market.20
The internal market depends on the proper application of the four
freedoms that lie at the heart of the Treaty of Rome: free movement
of goods; free movement of persons for employment, including the
rights of establishment for commercial and industrial purposes; free-
dom to provide services; and free movement of capital.21 The internal
market also depends on correlative rules that are linked to the four
basic freedoms. 22
1. The Free Movement of Goods
The freedoms listed above cannot be kept in totally separate com-
partments. However, the freedom of movement of goods 23 stands out
as the most important of the four.24 It is linked with the institution of
a customs union,25 and it is the cornerstone of the Common Market.
This is the area in which real money is at stake, in which trade hackles
most readily rise, and in which national economic interests begin to
feel that they are at risk. The importance of the free movement of
goods is illustrated by the fact that movement of goods comes first in
20. Case 15/81 Gaston Schul v. Inspectuer der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1982
E.C.R. 1409, 35 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 229 (1982).
21. EEC Treaty, arts. 48-73.
22. These include rules concerning competition and state aide, the prohibition of dis-
criminatory internal taxation, and liberalization of current payments.
23. Although the word "goods" is not defined by the Treaty, the Court has construed it
broadly as meaning products that can be valued in money and that are capable of forming
the subject matter of commercial transactions. See Case 7/68 Commission v. Italy, 1968
E.C.R. 423.
24. Free movement of goods within the Community raises different issues from those
concerning the entry of goods into the Community.
Even though the customs union is not complete, the Member States have common rules
for tariffs on imports into the Community from third countries. They also strive towards a
common external commercial policy.
The freedom of movement of goods also affects goods originating outside the Commu-
nity. Goods from third countries that have been cleared through customs, and for which
duties have been paid, are assimilated to Community goods and are regarded as being in
free circulation in the Community.
25. In this respect the nationality or place of residence of the owner or importer or
exporter is not a relevant consideration. What matters is that the goods are in free circula-
tion in the Community, not whether the traders are European nationals.
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the Treaty and by the fact that the Court has already had to consider
over four-hundred cases in this area.
a. The prohibition of customs duties and charges having equivalent
effect
The free movement of goods is achieved primarily by the prohibi-
tion of customs duties between Member States.26 Customs duties are
fiscal duties that must be paid solely because the goods cross a frontier.
They have long since ceased to exist between Member States. How-
ever, "charges of equivalent effect" to customs duties are also prohib-
ited, both on imports and exports. The term "charges of equivalent
effect" is most controversial.
The Court tackled the problem in an early case that concerned a
charge imposed by Belgian law on diamond imports.27 The charge
was small, one-third percent of the value of goods that did not com-
pete with domestic products. The money collected went not to the
State but to a social fund for diamond workers. But, the Court found
that it was a charge of equivalent effect to a customs duty and accord-
ingly was prohibited. The Court gave the following definition, which
has subsequently been followed:
Any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designation and mode
of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by
reason of the fact they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the
strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect. . . even if it is not
imposed for the benefit of the State, is not discriminatory or protective in effect
or if the product on which the charge is imposed is not in competition with any
domestic product.2 8
This wide definition of the prohibition shows the Court's commitment
to creating a common internal Community market.
The Court has frequently had to examine charges imposed at the
frontier. If such a charge is made in the interests of the state, gener-
ally it is a charge of equivalent effect. However, if the charge is
imposed on behalf of the Community, it is not a charge of equivalent
effect. For example, charges that are made for the purposes of draw-
ing up import and export statistics, or for examining fruits, plants,
meat, or animals to ensure that goods crossing the frontier meet health
standards, are generally unlawful. On the other hand, charges that are
imposed at the frontier in return for services provided to importers or
exporters and that are for their benefit in getting the goods to their
destination have to be distinguished. These charges are permissible, so
26. EEC Treaty, art. 12.
27. Cases 2/69 and 3/69 Sociaal Fonds Voor De Diamantarbeiders, Antwerp v. S.A.
Ch. Brachfeld & Sons, Antwerp, 1969 E.C.R. 211, 8 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 335 (1969).
28. Id.
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long as they are proportionate to the cost to the state of providing the
service.
The line between permissible and impermissible charges is not
always easy to draw. In a recent case, a distinguished bibliophile in
the Netherlands ordered books from other Member States.29 The Post
Office in his country charged him a fee for clearing the goods through
customs. He challenged it in his national courts. On a reference to
the European Court by the national court, the Post Office argued that
the fee was merely a consideration for its work in clearing the books
through customs. The Court held that if he was presented with a fait
accompli, the charge was prohibited. But if he had the option to clear
the books himself, the charge, if commensurate with the cost, was a
permissible fee for services rendered.
b. The prohibition of internal taxation having discriminatory effect
The Treaty's prohibition of taxation that discriminates against
imports30 also causes problems of interpretation. In applying the pro-
hibition, it is necessary to decide whether the charge is equivalent to a
customs duty or whether it is internal taxation. If it is the latter and
does not discriminate against imports, it will generally be permissible.
This distinction again raises difficult questions the answers to which, I
suspect, have not finally been worked out. However, the Court has
given guidance. A charge on imports is not usually regarded as inter-
nal taxation unless it is imposed according to the same criteria and at
the same stage of marketing as charges imposed on domestic products.
The chargeable event must also be the same for both products. For
example, France imposed an internal tax on the slaughtering of cattle.
A charge in the same amount was imposed on cattle from other Mem-
ber States at the time of importation. Because the charge was imposed
in respect of different events, the European Court held it to be
equivalent to a customs duty, and the importer did not have to pay.31
The question is particularly acute if the country of importation
makes virtually none of the goods sought to be imported. The Court
has held, contrary to the views of the Commission, that even if only
one percent of the goods on which the charge is imposed are domestic,
it is still a form of internal taxation and not a charge equivalent to a
customs duty, and thus valid so long as it is not discriminatory. 32 The
29. Case 39/82 Donner v. Netherlands, 1983 E.C.R. 19, 36 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 711
(1983).
30. EEC Treaty, art. 95.
31. Case 132/78 Denkavit Loire v. France, 1979 E.C.R. 1923, 26 Comm. Mkt. L. R.
605 (1979).
32. Case 90/79 Commission v. France, 1981 E.C.R. 283, 32 Comm. Mkt. L. R. I
(1981).
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question arises whether the same can be true if a tax is imposed on all
goods of a particular kind, even if none of the goods is produced or
manufactured in the country imposing the taxation.
In a recent case, the Danish Goverment contended that a charge
for sanitary checks on peanuts was an internal tax.33 The checks were
part of a general system of health controls carried out by local authori-
ties. There was no doubt that the charge for the checks was a form of
valid internal taxation. In addition, however, the Government had
power to make special decrees covering specific foodstuffs. It had
made only two such decrees, for Brazil nuts and for peanuts. Neither
of these products is produced in Denmark. The European Court
decided that the decrees covered special goods and were too limited to
be a part of a general system of internal taxation. The Court held that
a charge may be equivalent to a customs duty even where there is no
domestic product with which the imports compete.
The taxation provisions complement the rule that goods should
move within the Community without customs duties. Member States
are prohibited from imposing internal taxation on the products of
other Member States that exceeds taxation of similar domestic prod-
ucts. Member States are also prohibited from imposing internal taxa-
tion on the products of other Member States so as to afford indirect
protection to other products.34 The limitations on taxation have a
wider effect than at first might appear. They are not limited to a situa-
tion in which different rates of tax are applied, but cover situations in
which the way in which tax is assessed favours domestic products.
For example, one country allowed domestic producers to defer pay-
ment of a tax on beer and spirits. The Court held the deferment inva-
lid because it was not given to the importers of beer and spirits. The
importer was therefore at a disadvantage. 35
A case that involved particularly difficult economic and technical
questions of this sort concerned the United Kingdom. It was con-
tended that the tax on a litre of wine, largely an imported product, was
five times that on beer, largely a domestic local product. 36 The United
Kingdom contended that the two were not in competition because
they are different products serving different social purposes and needs.
33. Case 158/82 Commission v. Denmark, 1983 E.C.R. 3573, 41 Comm. Mkt. L. R.
658 (1984).
34. EEC Treaty, art. 95.
35. Case 55/79 Commission v. Ireland, 1980 E.C.R. 481, 27 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 734
(1980).
36. Case 170/78 Commission v. United Kingdom, 1980 E.C.R. 417, 27 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. 716 (1980). A parallel problem arose in relation to a tax imposed by the Italian
government on imported cognac and whiskey as opposed to that which applied to domestic
grappa. See Case 319/81 Commission v. Italian Republic, 1983 E.C.R. 601, 37 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 517 (1983).
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Thirty years ago that argument might have had more chance of suc-
cess, but it was difficult to maintain in the light of the current increase
in wine consumption not just with meals, but also at parties and in
public houses. The Court on a first look at the case thought that it was
possible that the difference in tax could afford protection to beer. A
major problem, however, was the difference in the alcohol content
between wine and beer. A secondary problem was the price differen-
tial between the two products. Following its practice of avoiding con-
demning a Member State if a compromise can be reached in a sensitive
area-and the respective merits of beer and wine are a very sensitive
area-the Court sent the Government of the United Kingdom and the
Commission away to seek a compromise and in particular to address
the issue of alcohol content. When no agreement could be reached,
the Court ruled that cheaper table wines were in competition with beer
and that the tax on those wines was invalid. As a result, the United
Kingdom had to review its tax system to comply with the Court's
judgment. Loyal to the Anglo-Saxon spirit of compromise, instead of
reducing the tax on wine to the level appropriate to beer, the United
Kingdom increased the tax on beer and reduced the tax on wine so
that the two were approximately equal. In such a way are national
traditions broken and the drinking habits of individuals affected in the
Community.
These cases frequently deal with categories of goods rather than,
as happens in ordinary litigation, single transactions. Sometimes,
however, a single transaction challenged in the courts can lead to far-
ranging results under Community law. For example, in one case Ger-
many imposed a four-percent turnover-equalization tax on powdered
milk that was imported from Luxembourg to Germany but was not
subject to tax in Germany.37 The national court referred the case to
the European Court, which held the tax unlawful. As a result of the
decision, 300,000 complaints were received for improperly charged
taxes, and 25,000 actions for recovery of the tax were commenced
before the German courts.
C. PROHIBITION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND
MEASURES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT
A State can restrict the free movement of goods in yet another
way, by controlling the quantities of goods that traders import or
export. Such a control can clearly amount to a negation of the con-
cept of a free single market. The Treaties therefore prohibit "quantita-
37. Case 57/65 Liitticke v. Hauptzollamt Sarrelouis, 1966 E.C.R. 205, 10 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. 674 (1971).
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tive restrictions" on imports and exports.38 This provision is not very
difficult to apply. But it is not enough to legislate for the obvious
restriction. States can adopt measures that, whilst not expressly limit-
ing quantities, can indirectly have that effect. Therefore, "measures of
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports" are ruled
out.39 This prohibition, however, is not absolute. Some restrictions
may be necessary when public security or order, or human, animal, or
plant health and life are at risk. Member States have the burden of
showing that restrictions on imports or exports are justified on these
grounds and are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade.4°
Cases involving quantitative restrictions have raised questions of
considerable economic, indeed almost political, importance and diffi-
culty. Governments are inevitably under pressure from trade interests
to protect national products and industries. The Court has pursued a
firm and largely consistent line in these cases. The Court construes
measures of equivalent effect widely, particularly those that restrict
imports. Such restrictions must by and large be struck down. "[AIll
trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hinder-
ing, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade, are equivalent to quantitative restrictions. ' 41 Restrictions that
fall under other treaty provisions, such as fiscal provisions, are dealt
with separately from quantitative restrictions.42
Measures of equivalent effect may be invalid even if their effect on
imports is potential rather than actual or if they merely restrict
imports, rather than discriminate against imports in favour of domes-
tic products. A classic example can be found in the case in which the
Court struck down a German law that required that certain liqueurs,
no matter where they originated, not have less than a specified alcohol
content. 43 German liqueurs had that level. Cassis de Dijon, which is
made in France, did not. The Court held that the exclusion was a
breach of the Treaty because a product freely marketable in France
could not be sold in Germany.44 The Court, however, recognized that
38. EEC Treaty, art. 30.
39. Id.
40. EEC Treaty, art. 36.
41. Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Renoit and Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 14
Comm. Mkt. L. R. 436 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Case 74/76 Iannelli v. Meroni, 1977 E.C.R. 557, 20 Comm. Mkt. L. R.
688 (1977).
43. Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 26
Comm. Mkt. L. R. 494 (1979).
44. A recent case shows the converse. Germany prohibited the importation of wine-
based drinks unless they conformed to the law of the state of manufacture. Italian law
required a 16% alcohol content in vermouth but allowed exports with a lower alcohol
content. The German rule, therefore, prohibited the importation of this product because it
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obstacles to trade must be accepted insofar as they are necessary for
fiscal supervision, protection of public health, fair trading, and con-
sumer protection. However, the Court insisted that the laws of
importing Member States must not restrict imports if the laws' pur-
poses are sufficiently safeguarded by regulations already adopted in the
exporting States. Member States must cooperate to remove restric-
tions, giving due weight in their standards to rules already enforced in
the Member States from which the goods come. Furthermore, it is
crucial for national courts and the European Court to consider contin-
ually whether the ever-proliferating range of domestic regulations
impinges on the Community's essential need for the free movement of
goods.
The Court's decisions invalidating a wide range of restrictions 45
have created problems. At times, the problems have become so acute
that there is common talk of "wars." We have had the "wine war"
between France and Italy following the French efforts to keep vast
quantities of Italian wine off the French market,46 a "turkey war,"
when the United Kingdom, in breach of the Treaty, changed its policy
concerning measures that it thought should be obligatory in other
countries if a particular poultry disease occurred, 47 and a "lamb war,"
did not achieve the alcohol content fixed for the nationally-consumed product. The Court
held that this was a discriminatory provision and that it was perfectly possible to avoid
confusion, or the deception of the customer, by adequate labelling of the product to indi-
cate the alcohol content. See Case 59/82 Schutzverband v. Weinvertriebs GmbH, 1983
E.C.R. 1217, 39 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 319 (1984).
45. For example, the Court has invalidated limitations on the age of buses admitted
into Italy, see, e.g., Case 50/83 Commission v. Italy (Mar. 27, 1984); limitations on packag-
ing, see, e-g., Case 16/83 Prantl (Mar. 13, 1984) (German law that prohibited use of a bottle
of a particular shape for anything other than wine from a certain region); Case 261/81
Cebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt Pub A, 1982 E.C.R. 3961, 37 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 496
(1983) (invalidating limitations on packaging of margarine sold in Belgium); and a "buy
Irish" campaign, see Case 249/81 Commission v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 4005, 37 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 104 (1983) (Court found that Government's intention was to check flow of
imports from Member States, even though no binding rules had been made). See also Case
124/81 Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E.C.R. 203, 37 Comm. Mkt. L. R. (1983)
(invalidating requirement that imported heat-treated milk be tested even if tests had been
done in the exporting Member State); Case 193/80 Commission v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. 3019
(invalidating limitations on what could be called "vinegar").
However, the Court has stated that certain measures to improve a domestic industry can
be lawful. See, eg., Case 222/82 Apple & Pear Dev. Council v. Lewis, 1983 E.C.R. 4083,
41 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 733 (1984) (campaign to promote particular varieties of apples
would be lawful, but campaign to promote domestic apples would not); Case 237/82
Jongeneel Haas v. Netherlands (Feb. 7, 1984) (limitations to encourage improvement of
quality of domestic products, such as Dutch cheese, lawful if there is no discrimination
against imports).
46. The situation resulted from a surplus production of Italian wine that led France to
impose unjustified sampling, documentary queries, and delays. The Court held that these
practices violated the Treaty. Case 42/82 Commission v. France, 1983 E.C.R. 1013, 39
Comm. Mkt. L. R. 160 (1984).
47. See 40/82 Commission v. United Kingdom, 1982 E.C.R. 2793, 35 Comm. Mkt. L.
R. 497 (1982).
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when France made it virtually impossible for English lamb to enter the
French market.48
Do not conclude that all is peanuts, margarine, and turkey.
Apart from these homely products, major national interests may be at
stake. In a case recently decided, the Irish Government, in the inter-
ests of maintaining its oil supply, purchased a refinery in Ireland and
obliged petroleum companies to buy a percentage of their require-
ments from it at a higher price than that charged by rival commercial
companies. 49 There was no doubt, despite the Irish Government's
arguments, that this was a breach of the prohibition of restrictions on
imports. The question, however, was whether Ireland's actions were
justified on the grounds of public order or security.
The Court recognized that although the Community and the
International Energy Agency had taken measures to procure oil stocks
in order to reduce the damage of an oil crisis to Member States, these
measures could not ensure an adequate level of stocks. Having a refin-
ery reduced Ireland's vulnerability in the event that other refining
companies cut off supplies. Moreover, Ireland could buy crude oil
directly from producing countries. This might put Ireland in an
advantageous position if crude oil supplies were reduced. The Court
held that it was for the national courts to decide whether the Govern-
ment could require that a percentage of petroleum products be bought
from the refinery if the major oil companies refused to buy from it.
The Court warned, however, that the Government may not require
purchasers to buy more than was necessary to keep the refinery going.
The Court, though aware of the dangers of opening a Pandora's box
by widening the areas where Member States can invoke public security
in economic matters, has realistically accepted the importance of steps
that are crucial to modern government. What it has done, as I see it,
is to allow a Member State to impose otherwise impermissible import
quotas on grounds of protecting a nationalised industry.
So much for goods. The provisions for free movement of capital
do not have the same degree of precision or emphasis, important
though they are. Member States are required to abolish all restrictions
among themselves on the movement of capital belonging to Commu-
nity residents.50 Also, Member States must remove any discrimina-
tion based on nationality, residence of the parties, or the place where
48. Case 232/78 Commission v. French Republic, 1979 E.C.R. 2729, 27 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. 418 (1980). This "lamb war" illustrates the rare occasion when a government appar-
ently deliberately failed for a long time to comply with an order of the Court, other than
one simply dealing with the adoption of legislation. See Cases 24 and 97/80R Commission
v. French Republic, 1980 E.C.R. 1319, 32 Comm. Mkt.L. R. 25 (1981).
49. Case 72/83 Campus Oil Ltd. v. Ireland (July 10, 1984).
50. EEC Treaty, art. 67.
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their capital is invested.51
It has to be recognized, however, that capital movements are
closely connected with economic and monetary policy, for which the
Member States are largely responsible. A complete freedom of move-
ment of capital might well undermine the economic policy of one of
the Member States or create an imbalance in its payments and thus
impair the proper functioning of the Common Market. Varying
degrees of liberalisation have thus been adopted at the present stage of
development of the Common Market.
3. Competition Law
Brief reference must be made to two sets of rules that seek to
prevent distortion of competition. These rules are of great importance
in welding together various markets into one common market. In lan-
guage familiar to American lawyers, the Treaty prohibits the abuse by
undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market5 2
and concerted practices that affect trade and have as their object or
effect the restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market.53 The Commission, which investigates and adjudicates on
such agreements and practices, has the authority to impose substantial
fines. The Commission is subject to review by the Court. This is an
area of immediate concern to the American lawyer whose clients have
affiliates or agencies carrying on trade in Europe. In recent cases the
Court has been concerned with competition in fields such as computer
software,5 4 hi-fi equipment from Japan,55 and books sold pursuant to
price-fixing agreements between publishers and booksellers.5 6 The
Court must consider such questions as: Is a Hasselblad camera part of
the same market as a 35mm camera?57 Can Ford-Germany stop mak-
ing right-hand drive cars that British buyers purchase in Germany at a
lower cost than are available in Britain?58 Is the British American
Tobacco Company subject to a fine because of an agreement made
with a small Dutch tobacco manufacturer, which says that as a result
of the agreement it was effectively prevented from pursuing the
expanding German market for tobacco used for hand-rolled ciga-
51. EEC Treaty, art. 68.
52. EEC Treaty, art. 86.
53. EEC Treaty, art. 85.
54. Case 60/81 IBM v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639, 32 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 635
(1981).
55. Cases 100 to 103/80 SA Musique Diffusion Francaise v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R.
1825, 38 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 1825 (1983).
56. Cases 43/82 and 63/82 De Vereniging der Bevordering van het Vlaamse
Boekwezen v. Commission, (Jan. 17, 1984).
57. Case 86/82 Hasselblad Ltd. v. Commission, 39 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 559 (1984).
58. Cases 228/82 and 229/82 Ford of Europe, Inc. v. Commission, 39 Comm. Mkt. L.
R. 649 (1984).
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rettes?5 9 The elimination of these restrictions is a crucial task in the
creation of a true common market.
a. Issues of government subsidies
Increasingly, in a time of recession, states wish to give financial or
other aid to industries that are ailing, need reorganisation, or are in
financial difficulties, or to regions with heavy unemployment. Such
aids, in whatever form, that distort competition and trade among
Member States by favouring particular undertakings or the production
of certain goods, are incompatible with the Common Market.60 These
are sensitive areas of great economic difficulty. The Court, whether on
the complaint of the Commission under its policing powers or on the
complaint of a Member State whose industry is affected by a
neighbouring State's aids, must strike a balance. On the one hand, the
Court must ensure that the procedural rules laid down by the Treaty
are faithfully observed,61 and on the other, the Court must ensure that
the Commission is allowed to exercise its rightful discretion.62
E. COAL AND STEEL TREATY ISSUES
So far I have referred to the Economic Community, because that
is where most of the legal questions have arisen. The Coal and Steel
Treaty, however, cannot be ignored. It provided the early cases in
which many principles were explored and developed. From the end of
the fifties to the end of the seventies not very many cases came before
the Court. Since then, however, the position has been very different.
The steel industry in the United States has had its problems, and the
crisis has also been very serious in Europe. To get rid of surplus steel,
companies began to sell below the list prices, which they were obliged
under the Treaty to publish. This was held unlawful, and they were
fined. A rule was made that in certain sectors producers must observe
minimum prices. The legality of that rule was challenged on the basis
that in particular areas there was no crisis so that price-cutting
between dealers still took place. The Court criticised this latter dis-
tinction but upheld the adopted system as justified in the light of the
59. Case 35/83 British American Tobacco v. Commission, pending.
60. See EEC Treaty, art. 92. This prohibition is subject to precise exceptions set out in
the Treaties or to the exercise of the Commission or Council's discretionary powers.
61. See, e.g., Case 84/82 Germany v. Commission (Mar. 20, 1984) (The Court set
aside the Commission's approval of a scheme devised by the Belgian Government to
restructure its textile industry because the Commission had not properly consulted the
German Government.).
62. See, eg., Case 730/79 Phillip Morris v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 2671, 31 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 321 (1981) (The Court held that the Commission was entitled, in judging
whether the standard of living was abnormally and the rate of unemployment seriously
high in a particular area, to compare area not only with the Netherlands but also with the
Community as a whole.).
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existing problem and stressed that in a time of crisis Community soli-
darity requires sacrifices. As things got worse, the Commission intro-
duced quotas for production and delivery in the Common Market-
quotas fixed by reference to earlier periods of production. This too
was attacked by sectors of the industry on the basis that the fair way
was to fix quotas by reference not to what actually happened in the
past, but to current production capacity. That argument was rejected
by the Court on the basis that objectively it was a perfectly tenable test
for the Commission to adopt, and indeed one that avoided the more
difficult exercise of assessing capacity. Moreover, it avoided discrimi-
nation between producers in that it applied the same reference period
to each, and gave power for adjustments to be made on the application
of producers themselves. Finally, an attempt was made to argue that
producers in Member States should not be obliged to reduce their pro-
duction unless the Commission restricted imports from other coun-
tries. The Court refused to accept this. Since the Community
accepted far more steel than it had imported, the Commission in its
discretion was entitled to require that internal production be reduced
rather than to seek to persuade non-member countries to reduce their
exports.
In the last three years the Court has received a substantial
number of these cases. In some, heavy fines have been reduced. But
overall, the Court has been obliged to rule that the interventionist
measures taken have been justified by the compelling needs of the
Community as a whole.
CONCLUSION
In the creation of this Common Market-so much more than a
free trade area or a customs union-the economic questions discussed
here inevitably loom large. Though economic law may be a relatively
new phrase for the conventional lawyer, it has created for judges, prac-
titioners, and universities different, more complex perspectives. It has
proved right, as so often events do, the words of Lord Denning in 1974
in relation to the English courts:
The Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the
rivers. It cannot be held back. In future in transactions which cross the fron-
tiers we must no longer speak or think of English law on its own. We must
speak and think of Community law, of Community rights and obligations and
we must give effect to them. This means a great effort for the lawyers. We
have to learn a new system. We must get down to it.63
63. H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A., [1974] 1 Ch. 401.
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II
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Although economic considerations were the primary motivation
in the establishment of the Treaty of the European Community,' the
Treaty was not limited to the development of a common market and
the expansion of the economy. The founding fathers-a phrase I
think you must have given the English language since in England
things are not founded, but like Topsy,2 just grow-recognised that
the well-being of the individual and other social factors were crucial to
the health of the Community. The concern of the Treaty was for peo-
ple as well as for commerce. 3 For example, one of the "tasks" spelled
out in Article 2 of the Treaty was to promote "an accelerated raising
of the standard of living" of the peoples of the Community, and one of
its "activities" was to abolish obstacles to freedom of movement for
persons and services. Another activity was to create a European
Social Fund to improve employment opportunities for workers and to
contribute to the raising of their standard of living. The aim of these
and related provisions was both to improve social conditions and to
work towards their harmonisation throughout the Member States.
A. EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK
One positive decision taken during the initial stage of the Com-
munity's establishment was that men and women must receive equal
pay for equal work. To you in this room nearly thirty years later, that
may not sound like a very dramatic step. But in the social and labour
conditions existing in some if not all of the Member States this was a
significant development.
The implementation of the principle of equal pay for equal work
was not left merely to the Member States to do in their own way at
their own time. The European Court of Justice, having established
that Community law is an autonomous system of law that is supreme
and overrides national laws when the two conflict, 4 firmly ruled that
this provision is so clear and precise that it is a part of the Community
law that should be enforced by national courts without supplemental
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2. See H.B. STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, ch. 20, at 228 (Airmont ed. 1967).
3. One very important illustration is Article 177. Article 177 allows national courts,
in litigation involving private citizens, to make references to the European Court of Justice
so that private citizens may also have the benefit of the Court's interpretation of Commu-
nity provisions. For example, see the discussion of the Luisi case infra pp. 29-30.
4. This fundamental Community principle was not provided for in the Treaty but was
promulgated by the Court.
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national legislation. In the language of Community lawyers, it is a
provision that has "direct effect." The Court construed "pay" broadly
to include private pension scheme contributions paid by an employer
for the benefit of his workers.5 Pay also included free rail transporta-
tion given during or after employment.6
A subsequent Community Directive mandated that men and
women must receive equal treatment with respect to equal work, i.e.,
work that is broadly similar or work of equal value. The importance
of this provision can be seen in a recent case in which the Court held
that the provisions of the United Kingdom's 1975 Equal Pay Act were
not in compliance with Community law.7 The Act provided that a job
classification system was the only means for determining the attribu-
tion of equal value to different work. Furthermore, the Act did not
permit the introduction of a classification system without the
employer's consent. The Court held that under the Directive a job
classification scheme was merely one of several methods for determin-
ing work to which equal value could be attributed. Therefore, the Act
had to be amended to guarantee equal pay for equal work to workers
whose employers refused to introduce a classification system.
Directives that provide for equal access to employment and equal
opportunities for promotion are now in force. For example, in a case
where sex discrimination against a woman was clearly shown, German
law merely gave nominal damages, two marks. The Court held that,
although it is for the national authorities to give effect to this Directive
because it is not in such clear and precise language that it can be relied
on directly in the national courts, the national authorities must make
sure that national law provides a significant sanction to prevent dis-
crimination. The choice of sanctions, however, is for the national
authority.8 There is no Community rule that a person refused a job on
the grounds of sex must be given a job. But if damages are the rem-
edy, they must adequately compensate for the loss of the opportunity.
It is not sufficient merely to award the amount of expenses incurred in
applying and, for example, attending the interview.
The applicant does not, however, always win. In a recent case,
for example, the Court was asked to rule that sex discrimination arises
when a mother is allowed paid leave from the end of the second month
after a child is born to the end of the sixth month but the father is
5. Case 69/80 Worringham v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., 1981 E.C.R. 767, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.
R. 1 (1981).
6. Case 12/81 Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 359, 33 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 696 (1982).
7. Case 61/81 Commission v. United Kingdom, 1982 E.C.R. 2601, 35 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. 284 (1982).
8. Case 14/83 Von Colson v. Nordrhein-Westfalen and Case 79/83 Herz v. Neutsche
Tradex (Apr. 10, 1984).
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not.9 A father had taken off the four months between the end of the
second month and the end of the sixth month while the mother
worked. He claimed statutory pay on the basis that the parents could
arrange between them which of them should stay at home to look after
the child. The Commission supported his claim. The Court, however,
held that even though the provision was in part for the protection of
the child, the provision was primarily for the protection of the
mother's health and therefore was excluded from the sex equality pro-
visions. There is no compulsory paid paternity leave in the
Community.
The equality provisions, while important, are limited because
they do no more than require equal pay. They do not provide for
equality in other matters such as mandatory retirement age. Nor do
they deal with all rights under national social security law. Other
Community legislation will treat these matters.
B. SOCIAL LAW PROVISIONS
The Treaty gave to the Commission the task of promoting close
cooperation of Member States in the social field, particularly in
employment, labour law and working conditions, social security, and
the right of association.10 Directives have been made under these pro-
visions, but progress is uneven, and much remains to be done. Despite
the many cases that the Court of Justice has decided in the social law
field, it is plain that the main initiative and responsibility currently lie
with national governments. With so many divergent rules among
Member States, however, it remains difficult to reach unanimous
agreement on the harmonisation of laws. This is true despite the work
of international bodies like the International Labour Organisation.
Nevertheless, the framework is there, with a Commissioner spe-
cifically responsible for social and particularly labour-related policies
of the Community. In a time of recession this is of singular impor-
tance. Moreover, the European Social Fund increases the geographi-
cal and occupational mobility of workers. The Fund can be used to
give temporary aid to unemployed workers until they obtain other
employment. In addition, state organisations may receive public funds
to assist the re-employment and resettlement allowances.
Directives have required that an enterprise taking over the under-
taking of another enterprise re-employ the workers in that undertak-
ing. Although this may sound like a simple principle, it is difficult to
apply. For example, must the purchaser of a bankrupt business rehire
9. Case 184/83 Hoffman v. Barmer Ersatzkasse (July 12, 1984).
10. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, arts. 117-130.
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the employees or assume their labor contracts?" The need to protect
the workers must be balanced against the desire to encourage purchase
of the business by not imposing on the purchaser the burdens of taking
on more workers than he can afford. The task is made no easier by the
differing concepts of bankruptcy and liquidation that exist between the
different legal systems.
The case law of the Court is progressively developing in the areas
of freedom of movement of workers and services, the right of estab-
lishment of a business, and matters of social security that have been
dealt with by legislation.
The cornerstone of the EEC's social policy is the requirement
that discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Mem-
ber States in employment, remuneration, and employment conditions
be abolished. Workers have the right, subject to limitations justified
on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health, to accept
offers of employment and to move about freely within the territory of
Member States for the purpose of employment. Workers may stay in a
Member State for the purpose of employment on the same conditions
as nationals of that state and, after having been employed, on condi-
tions laid down by the Community. 12 These basic rules have been
elaborated by a series of directives that prohibit discrimination against
non-nationals in such areas as taxation and social security benefits.
Directives also enable a worker to bring his spouse and family with
him as of right and to move by merely producing an identity card or
passport as well as to receive a residence permit.' 3
The Court has not yet had to decide the precise meaning of
"spouse,"-whether it is limited to persons who have gone through a
ceremony recognised by the law or whether people living together as
man and wife are included. Equally, the scope of the provisions that
define who are dependants living under the same roof may one day
have to be elaborated.
The Court has already recognised that the residence permit is not
the legal basis of the right of a worker to stay in a country other than
his own. His right to stay comes directly from the Treaty. The permit
is solely evidence of the fact that he has exercised that right. The
11. This was an issue in four cases that the Court recently decided. See Case 19/83
Wendelboe e.a. v. LJ Music Aps in Liquidation; Case 135/83 Abels v. Administrative Bd.
of the Bedrijfsvereninging voor de Melaalindustrie en de Electrotechnische Industrie; Case
179/83 Industriebond & Federatie Nelerdandse Vakbeweging v. Netherlands; Case 186/83
Botzen e.a. v. Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij. Judgments in these four cases were
delivered on February 7, 1985.
12. EEC Treaty, art. 48(3).
13. The right to receive a residence permit includes the right not to be excluded on the
grounds of public policy or public security other than in respect to one's personal conduct.
Criminal conviction, however, is not in itself a ground for exclusion.
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Court has gone far to insist on this. Accordingly, if a worker fails to
complete the necessary formalities or to report his presence, he may be
subject to a financial penalty, but he cannot be expelled from the coun-
try. Nor must he apply for permission to enter. The Court's decisions
all spring from the recognition that the Treaty gives workers the right
to reside in another Member State in the interests of creating a mobile
labour force within the Community.14
Despite these decisions, the provisions of the Treaty do not sim-
ply give a right to EEC nationals to move about and take up residence
in the Community. We are a long way from that. The right is given
only to "workers" of a Member State.15 It is limited to those who are
employed by others under what English law would call a "contract of
service." That the right does not extend to an independent contractor
or a self-employed person seems clear from the existence of a separate
right given to those who seek to provide services or to set up a busi-
ness. 16 But what is "a worker" and what constitutes "employment"
may vary from legal system to legal system. The Court has, in the
interests of Community integration, made it clear that these words
must be construed in a Community context and by Community crite-
ria in order that there be a common test for establishing these rights.
The Court has not yet, however, had to refine the tests so as to distin-
guish between workers and those who provide services. The Court
will probably one day have to do so, however, in light of the different
tests adopted in the various Member States.
Some national courts have made an attempt to limit Community
rights of freedom of movement to those who work full time, regularly,
and with a sufficient degree of industry. For example, an English
court refused "worker" status to a young Sardinian on the ground that
he had "lived the life of an itinerant vagrant, leaving Sardinia and
wandering across Europe and that the only work he has done has been
some casual work of the washing-up-in-restaurants type." 17 And a
German court refused to recognize as a worker a person whom it
described as "a mere idle layabout".,
8
Although there may be extreme cases when limiting the definition
of "worker" is justified, this approach should not be taken too far.
The Court has given some guidance as to who may be a worker. In
14. See, eg., Case 118/75 State v. Watson, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, 18 Comm. Mkt. L. R.
552 (1976); Case 167/73 Commission v. France, 1974 E.C.R. 359, 14 Comm. Mkt. L. R.
216 (1974); Regina v. Pieck, 1980 E.C.R. 2171, 29 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 220 (1980).
15. EEC Treaty, art. 48.
16. See EEC Treaty, art. 52.
17. Regina v. Secchi, 15 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 383 (1975) (Metropolitan Magistrate,
Marylebone, Mar. 25, 1974).
18. Judgment of Nov. 14, 1966, Landgericht, Wiesbaden, W. Ger., 7 Comm. Mkt. L.
R. 239 (1968).
1985]
24 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
one case the Court declared that a sports player can claim rights as a
worker only in so far as the games that he plays are regarded as an
economic activity. 19 For example, a professional pacemaker in cycle
races may be a worker,20 but the part-time footballer is probably not.
Of wider import was a ruling that concerned a British woman with
some independent means who worked for a few hours a day at a wage
below what the Dutch Government regarded as the necessary subsis-
tence level.21 The Dutch Government sought to exclude her from the
exercise of rights under the Treaty on the basis that she was merely
doing nominal work in order to obtain the rights to have her husband,
a South African national, accompany her to the Netherlands.
The Court rejected these arguments, holding that "worker" can
include part-time workers, even those who earn less than subsistence
level, so long as they occupy real and effective part-time employment.
As long as they do so, their other reasons for wishing to enter the
Community are irrelevant. This case caused concern in some other
countries that a large number of wives might exploit Community law
by working part time in order to bring in husbands of other nationali-
ties, thereby avoiding difficulties or even quotas under their national
law. The Court's decision in my view was of considerable importance
in preventing Member States from applying the rules too restrictively.
If, however, a person wants to get a job in a particular country,
the best way is often to live in that country and then to start looking.
A right to move about the Community to look for employment would
seem likely to make a substantial contribution to a free labour market
economy, despite the risk that people might use such a right as an
excuse to set up home in another Member State without the necessary
means and without a real intention to look for work. The express pro-
visions of the Treaty, taken literally, suggest that there is no such
right. The right given is to take up offers of employment actually
made and to move freely for such purpose, i.e., for accepting such
offers and no doubt for carrying out the jobs accepted. Obiter dicta of
the Court and one Advocate General suggest, however, that such a
right may exist.22 And the Council decided in a resolution, which has
no binding legal force, that persons should be permitted to enter a
Member State other than their own for a period of three months to
19. Case 13/76 Donf v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, 18 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 578 (1976).
20. Case 36/74 Walrave v. Association Union Cydliste Internationale, 1974 E.C.R.
1405, 15 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 320 (1975).
21. Case 53/81 Levin v. Secretary of State for Justice, 1982 E.C.R. 1035, 34 Comm.
Mkt. L. R_ 454 (1982).
22. Id.; see Case 48/75 Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 497, 18 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 619 (1976);
Case 118/75 State v. Watson, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, 1204, 18 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 552 (1976)
(Opinion of the Advocate General).
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look for employment. 23 This is a difficult area in which rights, if they
are to exist, should be precisely defined by regulation, rather than
deduced by the Court as a matter of interpretation. So far the ques-
tion has not had to be faced. If it does arise, it seems likely that the
Court will deduce some narrowly defined right from the economic and
social aims of the Treaty rather than deny the right on the basis of the
literal wording of the relevant provisions of the Treaty.
C. NATIONALS' ACTIONS AGAINST THEIR OWN MEMBER STATES
Free movement of goods does not depend on the national origin
of the goods or on the nationality of the owner. Free movement of
workers, however, seems clearly to be limited to the nationals of Mem-
ber States despite the fact that, unlike the terms of the Coal and Steel
Treaty, the basic provision is simply that "freedom of movement for
workers shall be secured within the Community." The provisions
prohibiting discrimination are plainly limited to workers who are
nationals of Member States. Unlike the term "worker," which is to be
defined as a matter of Community law, it seems clear that in accord-
ance with the general rule of international law, it is for the Member
States to decide as a matter of domestic law who are their nationals.
That leads directly to the question whether a national of a Member
State can exercise his Community rights against his own Member
State, whatever may be his rights of entry under domestic or public
international law. This query arises in part from the fact that self-
employed persons and those setting up businesses have rights of estab-
lishment only in the territory of another Member State.
It seems to me that a worker can assert Community law rights
against his own Member State in situations in which Community law
controls. He cannot, however, rely on the rights given to workers by
the EEC in a purely domestic situation. For example, although a
worker who has taken up employment in another Member State can
claim complementary rights to have his family with him as a matter of
Community law, a worker who has never lived or worked outside his
own state cannot claim these rights as a matter of Community law in
defiance of his national law. This issue arose in a case in which a
Dutchman who had never moved outside Holland sought to bring his
mother-in-law from Surinam to live in the Netherlands. 24 Because of
the provisions that were adopted when Surinam became an independ-
ent state, the mother-in-law lost her rights to Dutch nationality and to
residence in Holland. The Court rejected the son-in-law's attempt to
23. Minutes of Discussion on Directive 63/360 (1963).
24. Cases 35-36/82 Morson v. Netherlands, 1982 E.C.R. 3723, 37 Comm. Mkt. L. R.
221 (1983).
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bring her in under Community law, because he had never exercised his
own Community-law right to take up employment outside Holland as
a worker. Similarly, a German member of the Communist Party,
which like extreme right-wing parties is proscribed in the Federal
Republic, claimed that he was discriminated against when he was pre-
vented from completing the second stage of a teacher training qualifi-
cation. The Court rejected the argument that this meant that he could
never qualify in Germany and could therefore never seek employment
in another Member State as a teacher. At the time he had not exer-
cised any Community-law right or sought to do so, and thus the
alleged discrimination against him was entirely a matter of German
domestic law.25 Similarly, a Community national's spouse who is not
a Community national may have no rights under Community law to
enter her husband's country if he has not moved from that country.
This is so even if the non-Community national spouse of a migrant
Member State worker could join her husband in the country to which
he has moved. However, when a national of one Member State has
qualified as a worker under Community law in another Member State
and has returned to his own country, he may be able to assert Commu-
nity law rights against his own country. Similar rights may also exist
for workers who spend certain seasons of the year working in other
countries of the Community or who live near a frontier and work in
the adjacent country or countries.
D. FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL
OCCUPATIONS
Parallel but necessarily different provisions are made for those
who wish to set up businesses or professional practices in other Mem-
ber States. They must be allowed to do so on the same terms as apply
to nationals within the host state, subject to restrictions justified on the
grounds of public order, public security, or public health.26 Many
complex factors have to be taken into account for which the Treaty
could not possibly have legislated. Instead, the Treaty required the
Institutions to draw up programmes that gave effect to this right by
removing restrictive rules and practices and gave priority treatment to
those activities in which freedom of establishment makes a particu-
larly valuable contribution to the development of production and
trade. The question of permissible restrictions is particularly sensitive
when one considers professional occupations. The content of univer-
sity degrees and professional diploma syllabuses may vary widely, and
standards in some subjects may be very different. Accordingly, the
25. Case 180/83 Moser v. Baden-Wuerttemberg, 41 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 720 (1984).
26. E.E.C. Treaty, arts. 52, 58.
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Institutions were required to issue Directives for the mutual recogni-
tion of diplomas, certificates, and other evidence of formal
qualification.
Many Directives have been issued to facilitate the freedom of
establishment, from agriculture to real estate. Less progress has been
made, however, in the mutual recognition of qualifications. The earli-
est steps were taken with regard to the medical profession, which is
perhaps the easiest area because the human body and illnesses are
much the same throughout the Community. Directives have laid
down rules of professional conduct so that doctors moving from one
country to another could not escape the disciplinary control of profes-
sional bodies. Similar provisions have been adopted for dentists, veter-
inary surgeons, and nurses, and drafts have been prepared for
pharmacists and engineers.
The welding together of Europe psychologically, to use a perhaps
inaccurate term, is a difficult task. The freedom of professionals to
move about is an important factor in the welding process. But if quali-
fications are to be mutually recognised, it is very important, as I
stressed in a recent Opinion, that university syllabuses be required to
contain aspects of subjects prescribed by the EEC, even if such sub-
jects have different names and classifications among Member States. 27
In that case the question was whether the syllabus prescribed by the
Italian Government for medical schools contained two subjects that
were obligatory under the Community directive. If they were not
included, the Italian Government would need to take steps to ensure
that the requirements of the Directive were met.
The rules facilitating the movement of professionals are already
having their effect. For example, a Dutchman who took a Belgian
medical degree that satisfied the terms of the Directive went back to
Holland intending to practise medicine. He was told that he could not
do so unless he studied general medicine for another year, as Dutch
medical students were required to do. The Court held this to be an
unlawful requirement.28 Having exercised his right to move as a doc-
tor qualified in Belgium, which also complied with European stan-
dards, he was entitled to practise at home. More recently, a veterinary
surgeon who was qualified in Italy was prosecuted for practising in
France. The first time he was prosecuted, the relevant Directive had
not come into force, and the power to prosecute was upheld. After the
Directive requiring recognition of diplomas had come into force, he
was prosecuted again by the French authorities, and on this occasion
27. Case 221/83 Commission v. Italy (Sept. 5, 1984).
28. Case 246/80 Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie, 1981 E.C.R. 2311,
33 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 91 (1982).
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the prosecution was held to be invalid.2 9
The corpus juris, however, varies more widely than the corpus
humanis. The legal profession, therefore, differs greatly throughout
the Member States. For example, our English division into barristers
and solicitors finds no real parallel in other Member States. Accord-
ingly, although rules have been laid down to enable lawyers to provide
services in other Member States-for example, to appear in court and
to give advice-there is no set of rules dealing with the right of estab-
lishment of lawyers. There have, however, been a number of impor-
tant cases concerning lawyers. In one case, the Court emphasised the
Community-law rule of equal treatment and nondiscrimination on the
basis of nationality. 30 A Dutchman with a Belgian qualification was
excluded from practising in Belgium because he was Dutch. The
Court held that even though specific measures had not been adopted
to spell out rights of establishment for lawyers, they cculd rely on the
Treaty provisions that confer a right of establishment and abolish dis-
crimination. These provisions have direct effect and are enforceable in
the national courts. The Dutch lawyer succeeded in his claim to prac-
tise before the Belgian courts.
The Paris Bar has been involved in two cases. In one it refused to
admit a Belgian not because he was of Belgian nationality, but because
he had a Belgian and not a French law diploma.3 1 The Bar argued
that he had no right* in Community law pending the Community's
adoption of precise rules to define the mutual recognition of diplomas.
The Court rejected this argument. The man had a Belgian doctorate,
which was recognised as the equivalent of a French doctorate in law,
and he had a qualifying certificate from the Paris Bar. Accordingly,
he could not be denied admission to the Paris Bar by the restrictive
requirement that he must have a French degree.
More recently, the Court gave judgment perhaps of a more sensi-
tive kind.32 In France an advocate may not have more than one prin-
cipal establishment, by and large, although he may argue in courts
elsewhere, advise clients elsewhere, and even operate subsidiary offices
through assistants. For example, you cannot be a member of the Bor-
29. Case 136/78 Ministere Public v. Auer, 1979 E.C.R. 437, 25 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 373
(1979).
30. Case 2/74 Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631, 14 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 305
(1974).
31. Case 71/76 Thieffry v. Conseil de 'lordre des avocats a ]a Cour de Paris, 1977
E.C.R. 765, 20 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 373 (1977). See also Case 65/77 Jean Razanatsimba,
1977 E.C.R. 2229, 21 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 246 (1978); Case 11/77 Patrich v. Ministre des
Affaires Culturelles, 1977 E.C.R. 1199, 20 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 523 (1977) (reaching a simi-
lar result with respect to the refusal of French authorities to allow a British architect, with
suitable and equivalent qualifications, to practise in France).
32. Case 107/83 Klopp v. Order of Advocates (July 12, 1984).
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deaux Bar and the Paris Bar with main offices in both towns. One
reason for this is that a French judge has tight command of the proce-
dures in a case, and he must be able to communicate on short notice
with the lawyer, who must have his main office within reach of the
courts of the area. However, some other nationals, particularly Amer-
icans, have been admitted to the Paris Bar. In this case, a young Ger-
man lawyer with a practice and an office in Dfisseldorf received a
French doctorate, had passed the Paris Bar examinations, and was of
unimpeachable reputation. He was refused admission to the Paris Bar
on the ground that he wanted to have an office in Paris whilst retain-
ing his office in Germany. Although the Court was conscious of the
internal rules of and problems among the various French bars, it ruled
that this restriction on a lawyer in another Member State was inconsis-
tent with Community law. It is of comfort to observe that the Paris
Court of Appeal had come to the same conclusion.
There may, of course, be situations in which qualifications are not
equivalent, so that Member States can impose additional require-
ments. The same is true of the right conferred on a Community
national who is established in one Member State to provide services in
another Member State. The difference between establishment and pro-
viding services is that in the former the base is set up in the second
country, while in the latter the base remains in the owner's own coun-
try and services are provided elsewhere. The dividing line, however, is
not always very clear.
Domestic conditions are such that a license issued in one country
may not be wholly appropriate in another. For example, when an
employment agency licensed in England sought to provide casual
labour for building workers in Holland, it was held that so far as Eng-
lish conditions had been fulfilled, the English license was sufficient.33
However, in view of the particular difficulties existing in Holland,
which justified imposition of further conditions, the Court stated that
it was necessary for anyone providing the services to satisfy the condi-
tions, as long as they did not discriminate on the basis of nationality.3
4
The principles adopted in these and other areas are common, and
it is important not to keep the various rules in watertight compart-
ments. Two recent decisions illustrate the link between purely eco-
nomic considerations and the rights of the individual.
In the first case the accused were charged before the Italian
courts with exporting quantities of foreign currency above the maxima
allowed by Italian legislation.35 They claimed to have used this cur-
33. Case 279/80 Webb, 1981 E.C.R. 3305.
34. Id. at 3307.
35. Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi v. Ministero del Tesoro (Jan. 31, 1984).
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rency in other Member States, where they went for tourism and medi-
cal care. The national court trying the case asked the Court whether
the laws in question were compatible with the Treaty provisions and
Directives concerning the free movement of capital. In particular, the
Court was asked whether the laws were valid under Article 106(1) of
the Treaty, which obliges Member States to authorise payments con-
nected with the movement of goods, services, and capital in the cur-
rency of the Member States where the creditor or beneficiary resides.36
The first question that arose was whether the ability to export
currency constitutes services, since it is not considered goods or capi-
tal. The Court's answer was that it does. The Treaty, however, only
speaks of the freedom to provide services in another Member State.
The Court, however, held that the right extends also to persons who
wish to receive services. Thus, restrictions must not be imposed either
by the host state, where the tourist goes, or by his own state, which he
wishes to leave. The same applies to a citizen who wishes to travel to
another country to receive medical care or education or to do business.
This part of the decision, which will no doubt excite the interest of
commentators, illustrates well how the Court applies Treaty rules in
order to achieve the fundamental objectives of the Community.
The second question in the case was how to reconcile the obliga-
tion to allow payments in foreign currency for tourism, medical care,
study, and business travel with the entitlement of a Member State to
prevent flights of capital. In a Solomon-like judgment, the Court ruled
that current payments with respect to services could not lawfully be
subjected to absolute maxima. A Member State could, however, fix
ceilings below which currency could be exported as a right, as long as
it left open the possibility of freeing additional currency when shown
to be needed to pay for services.
The second case demonstrates the way in which Community law
at times must be considered in the application of national criminal
law.3 7 The Court has frequently held that a citizen cannot be prose-
cuted for an offence under national legislation that has been left in
force in breach of a Community obligation to abolish it. In this case,
an Italian who resided in Germany was charged with attempting to
bring Deutschmarks in banknotes to Italy without obtaining the
authorisation prescribed by Italian exchange control legislation. He
claimed that he had brought the money from Germany into Italy to
buy machinery that he needed for his business in Germany. This was
an offence under the Italian law, which provided that non-residents
36. Article 106(1) also provides that the Member States will undertake to liberalise
additional payments if their economic situation and balance of payments permit.
37. Case 203/80 Criminal Proceedings Against Guerrino Caschi, 1981 E.C.R. 2595, 33
Comm. Mkt. L. R. 365 (1982).
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could re-export currency imported into Italy only if they followed pre-
scribed procedures, which the man had not done. The Court held that
the freedom of movement of capital did not prevent a state from for-
bidding the export of banknotes. Moreover, the Treaty required cur-
rent payments to be liberalised only insofar as was necessary for the
free movement of goods. Because payment in banknotes was not stan-
dard commercial practice, a Member State was not obliged to allow
payments in banknotes as opposed to more conventional commercial
ways.
E. IssuEs OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Social security is of interest to all in a modem society. To some it
is the main point of contact with government. In the European Com-
munity, social security remains largely a question for the Member
States. An exception to this is the regulation that implements the
requirement of equal treatment in employment between men and
women. There is to be equality of access, contributions, and benefits,
but such things as survivors' benefits and family benefits are left out of
the EEC framework, and the determination of pensionable age is left
for the Member States to determine.
In the context of the Community as a whole, the Treaty is princi-
pally concerned with the adoption of social security measures that are
necessary to provide freedom of movement of workers. For migrant
workers and their dependents, it is essential, if they are not to be
penalised for moving, that they be able to tote up the periods of insura-
ble employment that they have completed in various Member States.
These periods should be taken into account when the right to the bene-
fit and the amount of the benefit depend on specified completed peri-
ods of employment. The aim is thus not to replace national social
security schemes, although this would be a desirable long-term aim for
a wholly free social and economic market, but rather to coordinate
and, if need be, to supplement them for the benefit of workers who
have moved about. Workers have of course always moved about, and
a plethora of bilateral and multilateral national agreements has devel-
oped to take care of them. The Community's aim is principally to
replace and synchronise these national agreements.
Community social security regulations are despairingly complex
in their effort to treat not only migrant and frontier workers but also
the many types of social security benefits that now exist, for example,
unemployment, family, sickness and maternity, death and survivors'
rights, and industrial injury and professional diseases. Highly techni-
cal rules show how pensions are to be borne by the Member States.
Calculation of pensions is especially difficult when a period of work in
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a job that justifies a pension for a shorter working life, such as coal-
mining, is taken into account with periods worked in agriculture or
industries where the worker must work longer to qualify for a pension.
By and large, Community legislation produces results beneficial to the
worker. If it does not and he would do better by relying on national
rules, then, as the Court has ruled, he must not be deprived of the
higher national pension.33 Conversely, the worker is not entitled to
collect overlapping benefits, that is, to make unjustified gains by being
paid twice. However, even when this rule is observed, the migrant
may still do better because he has moved about more than the man or
woman who stayed put. This is an almost inevitable result of the fact
that national social security systems have not been harmonised.
F. HUMAN RIGHTS
No sketch of the individual in the Community would be complete
without a reference to questions of fundamental human rights. Some
countries in the Community, such as Germany, have basic or funda-
mental laws reminiscent of some of the provisions of your Constitution
and its amendments. In the United Kingdom we have no bill of rights.
Whether we should have one is highly controversial. All members of
the Community are, however, parties to the European Convention on
Human Rights, which is administered by the Council of Europe.
Many states other than members of the European Community have
also signed the Convention. This Convention is part of the national
law of some Member States but not part of English domestic law. The
Community is not a party to the Convention, because it is not a state.
Whether it should be made possible for the Community to join and
whether it should join are much-debated issues.
The Human Rights Convention is not, however, without its effect
in Community law. As I have already shown, the European Court has
spelled out general, though unwritten, principles of law that are to be
applied in national courts because they are accepted as fundamental
throughout the Community. In this way the Court has come to
recognise, in principle, guarantees of fundamental individual rights
that are found in the constitutions of some of the Member States. This
has been difficult to do. The Court began a conflict when it rejected
the notion that Community law should be held inapplicable if it con-
flicts with the German fundamental law. This produced a vigorous
reaction from the German and Italian constitutional courts. Why
should their citizens yield to Community measures that fly in the teeth
of basic concepts adopted in their own countries? Later, however, the
Court recognised that some rules were so firmly entrenched in the
38. Case 24/75 Petroni v. ONPTS, 1975 E.C.R. 1149.
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Member States they could indeed be adopted as part of Community
law. They were not followed as national rules, but as expressions of a
general principle of law that ought to be taken into account when
applying the Treaty. As one President of the Court put it:
There is complete agreement that when the Court interprets or supplements
Community law on a comparable basis, it is not obliged to take the minimum
which the national solutions have in common or their arithmetic mean or the
solution produced by the majority of the legal systems which is the basis for its
decision. The Court has to weigh up and evaluate a particular problem and
search for the best and most appropriate solution.
39
For example, a German who was entitled to subsidised butter
under Community social security legislation claimed that requiring
him to give his name and address on a coupon presented to the shop-
keeper was a breach of his privacy. The Court found that the coupon
did not in fact oblige him to give his name and address.40 But the
Court recognised that unwritten laws embodying fundamental human
rights must be protected in the Community. Thus, although Commu-
nity law must prevail over national laws, these laws and national tradi-
tions may inspire Community principles of human rights. The Court
went on to say that international treaties to which the Member States
are parties or on which they have collaborated could supply guidelines
to be followed within the framework of Community law.41
In 1979 the Court made its first express reference to the European
Convention on Human Rights, providing an important indication of
the Convention's status under Community law.42 In many of the cases
that have come before the Court, no violation has been established.
Yet the Court has recognised the existence of rights falling within the
Convention. These include a right to own and to use property under
Article 1 of the joint Protocol,43 a right not to be discriminated against
on the basis of religious belief under Article 9,44 a right to privacy
under Article 8, and a right to a fair hearing under Article 6(1).45
Moreover, the Court has held that restrictions on the ground of public
safety or national security can be justified only to the extent that they
are necessary for the protection of those interested in a democratic
society.
39. Case 155/79 AMTS Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 34 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 264 (1982).
40. Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 9 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 112
(1970).
41. Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 14 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 338
(1974).
42. Case 44/79 Hauer v. Land Rhineland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 29 Comm. Mkt. L.
R. 42 (1980).
43. Id.
44. Case 130/75 Prais v. Council, 1976 E.C.R. 1589, 18 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 708 (1976).
45. Case 136/79 National Panasonic UK) Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 29
Comm. Mkt. L. R. 169 (1980).
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In one case, an Italian who had lived all his life in France and
who was married to a French woman was active in trade union
affairs.46 As a result of his political activities, the French authorities
ordered his deportation. He was not, however, removed from France.
Instead, he was ordered to live in a different part of France, away from
his home and the area of his activities. He complained that the order
violated his right to free movement under the Treaty. The Court held
that public policy cannot be relied on as a justification for derogating
from the fundamental principles of equality of treatment and freedom
of movement of workers. Accordingly, restrictions on free movement
may be imposed only if there is a serious threat and if the threat comes
from the individual's specific circumstances, not considerations of a
general nature. The restriction in that case was held to be
unacceptable.
In a very recent case, a Danish fishing captain was prosecuted
under an English law for fishing in English waters.47 The regulation
was invalid under Community law when it was made, but it was subse-
quently made valid retroactively. The Court held that the conviction
must be set aside.
The principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive effect is one which
is common to all the legal orders of the Member States and is enshrined in
Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms as a fundamental right; it takes its place among the
general principles of law whose observance is ensured by the Court of Justice.
Consequently, the retroactivity provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation No.
170/83 cannot be regarded as validating ex post facto national measures which
impose criminal penalties at the time of the conduct at issue, if those measures
are not valid.
4 8
It can thus be seen how the Court accepts without argument that
certain principles contained in the European Convention are to be
treated as part of Community law. Although it cannot be said that the
Treaty of Rome creates a bill of rights, it is not fair to say that human
rights and fundamental freedoms have nothing to do with the Luxem-
bourg Court. In fact, the Court's protection of fundamental rights is
perhaps more flexible than protection would be under the sort of con-
vention on which all the Member States could agree. Moreover, the
Court enables human rights to be recognised in constantly changing
circumstances and perhaps even extended as needs arise.
What the Court has done is reflected in a 1977 resolution of the
Parliament and the Council that recited the principles established by
the Court. The resolution stressed the prime importance that the Par-
46. Case 36/75 Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 17 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. 140 (1976).
47. Case 63/83 Regina v. Kirk (July 10, 1984).
48. Id
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lament and the Council attach to the protection of fundamental
human rights, in particular those derived from the constitutions of the
Member States and from the European Convention. The rights are
rights that "they respect and will continue to respect."
CONCLUSION
This brief review of the cases illustrates that the European Eco-
nomic Community is not just concerned with macro-economic policies
and with the minutiae of regulating sales of skimmed milk powder and
maize. It is just as much concerned with developing a united eco-
nomic community of which the individual worker can feel himself to
be a part and which he feels is aware of his role and his importance.

